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I. Concentration of Production
and Monopolies
The enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid
concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises are one
of the most characteristic features of capitalism. Modern
production censuses give most complete and most exact data on
this process.
In Germany, for example, out of every 1,000 industrial
enterprises, large enterprises, i.e., those employing more
than 50 workers, numbered three in 1882, six in 1895 and nine
in 1907; and out of every 100 workers employed, this group of
enterprises employed. 22, 30 and 37, respectively.
Concentration of production, however, is much more intense
than the concentration of workers, since labour in the large
enterprises is much more productive. This is shown by the
figures on steam-engines and electric motors. If we take what
in Germany is called industry in the broad sense of the term,
that is, including commerce, transport, etc., we get the
following picture. Large-scale enterprises, 30,588 out of a
total of 3,265,623, that is to say, 0.9 per cent. These
enterprises employ 5,700,000 workers out of a total of
14,400,000, i.e., 39.4 per cent; they use 6,600,000 steam
horse power out of a total of 8,800,000, i.e., 75.3 per cent,
and 1,200,000 kilowatts of electricity out of a total of
1,500,000, i.e., 77.2 per cent.
Less than one-hundredth of the total number of enterprises
utilise more than three-fourths of the total amount
of steam and electric power! Two million nine hundred and
seventy thousand small enterprises (employing up to five
workers), constituting 91 per cent of the total, utilise only
7 per cent of the total amount of steam and electric power!
Tens of thousands of huge enterprises are everything; millions
of small ones are nothing.
In 1907, there were in Germany 586 establishments
employing one thousand and more workers, nearly one-tenth
(1,380,000) of the
total number of workers employed in industry, and they
consumed almost one-third (32 per cent) of the total
amount of steam and electric power.[1]
As we shall see, money capital and the banks make this
superiority of a handful of the largest enterprises still more
overwhelming, in the most literal sense of the word, i.e.,
millions of small, medium and even some big “proprietors” are
in fact in complete subjection to some hundreds of millionaire
financiers.
In another advanced country of modern capitalism, the
United States of America, the growth of the concentration of
production is still greater. Here statistics single out
industry in the narrow sense of the word and classify
enterprises according to the value of their annual output. In
1904 large-scale enterprises with an output valued at one
million dollars and over, numbered 1,900 (out of 216,180, i.e.,
0.9 per cent). These employed 1,400,000 workers (out of
5,500,000, i.e., 25.6 per cent) and the value of their output
amounted to $5,600,000,000 (out of $14,800,000,000, i.e., 38
per cent). Five years later, in 1909, the corresponding
figures were: 3,060 enterprises (out of 268,491, i.e., 1.1 per
cent) employing 2,000,000 workers (out of 6,600,000, i.e.,
30.5 per cent) with an output valued at $9,000,000,000 (out of
$20,700,000,000, i.e., 43.8 per cent).
[2]
Almost half the total production of all the enterprises of
the country was carried on by one-hundredth part of
these enterprises! These 3,000 giant enterprises embrace 258
branches of industry. From this it can be seen that at a
certain stage of its development concentration itself, as it
were, leads straight to monopoly, for a score or so of giant
enterprises can easily arrive at an agreement, and on the
other hand, the hindrance to competition, the tendency towards
monopoly, arises from the huge size of the enterprises. This
transformation of competition into monopoly is one of the most
important—if not the most important—phenomena of modern
capitalist economy, and we must deal with it in greater
detail. But first we must clear up one possible
misunderstanding.
American statistics speak of 3,000 giant enterprises in
250 branches of industry, as if there were only a dozen
enterprises of the largest scale for each branch of industry.
But this is not the case. Not in every branch of industry
are there large-scale enterprises; and moreover, a very
important feature of capitalism in its highest stage of
development is so-called combination of production,
that is to say, the grouping in a single enterprise of
different branches of industry, which either represent the
consecutive stages in the processing of raw materials (for
example, the smelting of iron ore into pig-iron, the
conversion of pig-iron into steel, and then, perhaps, the
manufacture of steel goods)—or are auxiliary to one another (for
example, the utilisation of scrap, or of by-products, the
manufacture of packing materials, etc.).
“Combination,”
writes Hilferding, “levels out the fluctuations of trade and
therefore assures to the combined enterprises a more stable
rate of profit. Secondly, combination has the effect of
eliminating trade. Thirdly, it has the effect of rendering
possible technical improvements, and, consequently, the
acquisition of superprofits over and above those obtained by
the ‘pure’ (i.e,, non-combined) enterprises. Fourthly, it
strengthens the position of the combined enterprises relative
to the ‘pure’ enterprises, strengthens them in the competitive
struggle in periods of serious depression, when the fall in
prices of raw materials does not keep pace with the fall in
prices of manufactured goods.”[3]
The German bourgeois economist, Heymann, who has written a
book especially on “mixed”, that is, combined, enterprises in
the German iron industry, says: “Pure enterprises perish, they
are crushed between the high price of raw material and the low
price of the finished product.” Thus we get the following
picture: “There remain, on the one hand, the big coal
companies, producing millions of tons yearly, strongly
organised in their coal syndicate, and on the other, the big
steel plants, closely allied to the coal mines, having their
own steel syndicate. These giant enterprises, producing
400,000 tons of steel per annum, with a tremendous output of
ore and coal and producing finished steel goods, employing
10,000 workers
quartered in company houses, and sometimes owning their own
railways and ports, are the typical representatives of the
German iron and steel industry. And concentration goes on
further and further. Individual enterprises are becoming
larger and larger. An ever-increasing number of enterprises in
one, or in several different industries, join together in
giant enterprises, backed up and directed by half a dozen big
Berlin banks. In relation to the German mining industry, the
truth of the teachings of Karl Marx on concentration is
definitely proved; true, this applies to a country where
industry is protected by tariffs and freight rates. The German
mining industry is ripe for expropriation.”[4]
Such is the conclusion which a bourgeois economist who, by
way of exception, is conscientious, had to arrive at. It must
be noted that he seems to place Germany in a special category
because her industries are protected by higher tariffs. But
this is a circumstance which only accelerates concentration
and the formation of monopolist manufacturers’ associations,
cartels, syndicates, etc. It is extremely important to note
that in free-trade Britain, concentration also leads to
monopoly, although somewhat later and perhaps in another form.
Professor Hermann Levy, in his special work of research
entitled Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts, based on
data on British economic development, writes as follows:
“In
Great Britain it is the size of the enterprise and its high
technical level which harbour a monopolist tendency. This, for
one thing, is due to the great investment of capital per
enterprise, which gives rise to increasing demands for new
capital for the new enterprises and thereby renders their
launching more difficult. Moreover (and this seems to us to be
the more important point), every new enterprise that wants to
keep pace with the gigantic enterprises that have been formed
by concentration would here produce such an enormous quantity
of surplus goods that it could dispose of them only by being
able to sell them profitably as a result of an enormous
increase in demand; otherwise, this surplus
would force prices
down to a level that would be unprofitable both for the new
enterprise and for the monopoly combines.” Britain differs
from other countries where protective tariffs facilitate the
formation of cartels in that monopolist manufacturers’
associations, cartels and trusts arise in the majority of
cases only when the number of the chief competing enterprises
has been reduced to “a couple of dozen or so”. “Here the
influence of concentration on the formation of large
industrial monopolies in a whole sphere of industry stands out
with crystal clarity.”[5]
Half a century ago, when Marx was writing Capital,
free competition appeared to the overwhelming majority of
economists to be a “natural law”. Official science tried, by a
conspiracy of silence, to kill the works of Marx, who by a
theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism had proved
that free competition gives rise to the concentration of
production, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development,
leads to monopoly. Today, monopoly has become a fact.
Economists are writing mountains of books in which they
describe the diverse manifestations of monopoly, and continue
to declare in chorus that “Marxism is refuted”. But facts are
stubborn things, as the English proverb says, and they have to
be reckoned with, whether we like it or not. The facts show
that differences between capitalist countries, e.g., in the
matter of protection or free trade, only give rise to
insignificant variations in the form of monopolies or in the
moment of their appearance; and that the rise of monopolies,
as the result of the concentration of production, is a general
and fundamental law of the present stage of development of
capitalism.
For Europe, the time when the new capitalism
definitely superseded the old can be established with
fair precision; it was the beginning of the twentieth century.
In one of the latest compilations on the history of the
“formation of monopolies”, we read:
“Isolated
examples of capitalist monopoly could be cited from the period
preceding 1860; in these could be discerned the embryo of the
forms that are so common today; but
all this
undoubtedly represents the prehistory of the cartels. The real
beginning of modern monopoly goes back, at the earliest, to
the sixties. The first important period of development of
monopoly commenced with the international industrial
depression of the seventies and lasted until the beginning of
the nineties.” “If we examine the question on a European scale,
we will find that the development of free competition reached
its apex in the sixties and seventies. It was then that
Britain completed the construction of her old-style capitalist
organisation. In Germany, this organisation had entered into a
fierce struggle with handicraft and domestic industry, and had
begun to create for itself its own forms of existence.”
“The
great revolution commenced with the crash of 1873, or rather,
the depression which followed it and which, with hardly
discernible interruptions in the early eighties, and the
unusually violent, but short-lived boom round about 1889,
marks twenty-two years of European economic history ... ..
During the short boom of 1889-90, the system of cartels was
widely resorted to in order to take advantage of favourable
business conditions. An ill-considered policy drove prices up
still more rapidly and still higher than would have been the
case if there had been no cartels. and nearly all these
cartels perished ingloriously in the smash. Another five-year
period of bad trade and low prices followed, but a new spirit
reigned in industry; the depression was no longer regarded as
something to be taken for granted: it was regarded as nothing
more than a pause before another boom.
“The
cartel movement entered its second epoch: instead of being a
transitory phenomenon, the cartels have become one of the
foundations of economic life. They are winning one field of
industry after another, primarily, the raw materials industry.
At the beginning of the nineties the cartel system had already
acquired-in the organisation of the coke syndicate on the
model of which the coal syndicate was later formed—a cartel
technique which has hardly been improved on. For the first
time the great boom at the close of the nineteenth century and
the crisis of 1900-03 occurred entirely—in the mining and iron
industries at least—under the aegis of the cartels. And while
at that time it appeared to be something novel, now the
general public takes it for
granted that large
spheres of economic life have been, as a general rule, removed
from the realm of free competition.”[6]
Thus, the principal stages in the history of monopolies
are the following: (1) 1860-70, the highest stage, the apex of
development of free competition; monopoly is in the barely
discernible, embryonic stage. (2) After the crisis of 1873, a
lengthy period of development of cartels; but they are still
the exception. They are not yet durable. They are still a
transitory phenomenon. (3) The boom at the end of the
nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03. Cartels become
one of the foundations of the whole of economic life.
Capitalism has been transformed into imperialism.
Cartels come to an agreement on the terms of sale, dates
of payment, etc. They divide the markets among themselves.
They fix the quantity of goods to be produced. They fix prices.
They divide the profits among the various enterprises, etc.
The number of cartels in Germany was estimated at about
250 in 1896 and at 385 in 1905, with about 12,000 firms
participating.[7]
But it is generally recognised that these figures are
underestimations. From the statistics of German industry for
1907 we quoted above, it is evident that even these 12,000
very big enterprises probably consume more than half the steam
and electric power used in the country. In the United States
of America, the number of trusts in 1900 was estimated at 185
and in 1907, 250. American statistics divide all industrial
enterprises into those belonging to individuals, to private
firms or to corporations. The latter in 1904 comprised 23.6
per cent, and in 1909, 25.9 per cent, i.e., more than
one-fourth of the total industrial enterprises in the country.
These employed in 1904, 70.6 per cent, and in 1909, 75.6 per
cent, i.e., more than three-fourths
of the total
wage-earners. Their output at these two dates was valued at
$10,900,000,000 and $16,300,000,000, i.e., 73.7 per cent and
79.0 per cent of the total, respectively.
At times cartels and trusts concentrate in their hands
seven- or eight-tenths of the total output of a given branch
of industry. The Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, at its
foundation in 1893, concentrated 86.7 per cent of the total
coal output of the area, and in 1910 it already concentrated
95.4 per cent.[8]
The monopoly so created assures enormous profits, and leads to
the formation of technical production units of formidable
magnitude. The famous Standard Oil Company in the United
States was founded in 1900: “It has an authorised capital of
$150,000,000. It issued $100,000,000 common and $106,000,000
preferred stock. From 1900 to 1907 the following dividends
were paid on the latter: 48, 48, 45, 44, 36, 40, 40, 40 per
cent in the respective years, i.e., in all, $367,000,000. From
1882 to 1907, out of total net profits amounting to
$889,000,000, $606,000,000 were distributed in dividends, and
the rest went to reserve capital.[9]
“In 1907 the various works of the United States Steel
Corporation employed no less than 210,180 people. The largest
enterprise in the German mining industry, Gelsenkirchener
Bergwerksgesellschaft, in 1908 had a staff of 46,048 workers
and office employees.”[10]
In 1902, the United States Steel Corporation already produced
9,000,000 tons of steel.[11]
Its output constituted in 1901, 66.3 per cent, and in 1908,
56.1 per cent of the total output of steel in the United
States.[12]
The output of ore was 43.9 per cent and 46.3 per cent,
respectively.
The report of the American Government Commission on Trusts
states: “Their superiority over competitors is due
to the magnitude
of their enterprises and their excellent technical equipment.
Since its inception, the Tobacco Trust has devoted all its
efforts to the universal substitution of mechanical for manual
labour. With this end in view it has bought up all patents
that have anything to do with the manufacture of tobacco and
has spent enormous sums for this purpose. Many of these
patents at first proved to be of no use, and had to be
modified by the engineers employed by the trust. At the end of
1906, two subsidiary companies were formed solely to acquire
patents. With the same object in view, the trust has built its
own foundries, machine shops and repair shops. One of these
establishments, that in Brooklyn, employs on the average 300
workers; here experiments are carried out on inventions
concerning the manufacture of cigarettes, cheroots, snuff,
tinfoil for packing, boxes, etc. Here, also, inventions are
perfected.”[13]
“Other trusts also employ what are called development
engineers whose business it is to devise new methods of
production and to test technical improvements. The United
States Steel Corporation grants big bonuses to its workers and
engineers for all inventions that raise technical efficiency,
or reduce cost of production.”[14]
In German large-scale industry, e.g., in the chemical
industry, which has developed so enormously during these last
few decades, the promotion of technical improvement is
organised in the same way. By 1908 the process of
concentration of production had already given rise to two main
“groups” which, in their way, were also in the nature of
monopolies. At first these groups constituted “dual alliances”
of two pairs of big factories, each having a capital of from
twenty to twenty-one million marks-on the one hand, the former
Meister Factory in Hochst and the Casella Factory in Frankfurt
am Main; and on the other hand, the aniline and soda factory
at Ludwigshafen and the former Bayer Factory at Elberfeld.
Then, in 1905, one of these groups, and in 1908 the other
group, each concluded an
agreement with yet
another big factory. The result was the formation of two
“triple alliances”, each with a capital of from forty to fifty
million marks. And these “alliances” have already begun to
“approach” each other, to reach “an understanding” about
prices, etc.[15]
Competition becomes transformed into monopoly. The result
is immense progress in the socialisation of production. In
particular, the process of technical invention and improvement
becomes socialised.
This is something quite different from the old free
competition between manufacturers, scattered and out of touch
with one another, and producing for an unknown market.
Concentration has reached the point at which it is possible to
make an approximate estimate of all sources of raw materials (for
example, the iron ore deposits) of a country and even, as we
shall see, of several countries, or of the whole world. Not
only are such estimates made, but these sources are captured
by gigantic monopolist associations. An approximate estimate
of the capacity of markets is also made, and the associations
“divide” them up amongst themselves by agreement. Skilled
labour is monopolised, the best engineers are engaged; the
means of transport are captured—railways in America, shipping
companies in Europe and America. Capitalism in its imperialist
stage leads directly to the most comprehensive socialisation
of production; it, so to speak, drags the capitalists, against
their will and consciousness, into some sort of a new social
order, a transitional one from complete free competition to
complete socialisation.
Production becomes social, but appropriation remains
private. The social means of production remain the private
property of a few. The general framework of formally
recognised free competition remains, and the yoke of a few
monopolists on the rest of the population becomes a hundred
times heavier, more burdensome and intolerable.
The German economist, Kestner, has written a book
especially devoted to “the struggle between the cartels and
outsiders”, i.e., the capitalists outside the cartels. He
entitled his work
Compulsory Organisation, although, in order to
present capitalism in its true light, he should, of course,
have written about compulsory submission to monopolist
associations. It is instructive to glance at least at the list
of the methods the monopolist associations resort to in the
present-day, the latest, the civilised struggle for “organisation”:
(1) stopping supplies of raw materials ... “one of the most
important methods of compelling adherence to the cartel”); (2)
stopping the supply of labour by means of “alliances” (i.e.,
of agreements between the capitalists and the trade unions by
which the latter permit their members to work only in
cartelised enterprises); (3) stopping deliveries; (4) closing
trade outlets; (5) agreements with the buyers, by which the
latter undertake to trade only with the cartels; (6)
systematic price cutting (to ruin “outside” firms, i.e., those
which refuse to submit to the monopolists. Millions are spent
in order to sell goods for a certain time below their cost
price; there were instances when the price of petrol was thus
reduced from 40 to 22 marks, i.e., almost by half!); (7)
stopping credits; (8) boycott.
Here we no longer have competition between small and
large, between technically developed and backward enterprises.
We see here the monopolists throttling those who do not submit
to them, to their yoke, to their dictation. This is how this
process is reflected in the mind of a bourgeois economist:
“Even
in the purely economic sphere,” writes Kestner, “a certain
change is taking place from commercial activity in the old
sense of the word towards organisational-speculative activity.
The greatest success no longer goes to the merchant whose
technical and commercial experience enables him best of all to
estimate the needs of the buyer, and who is able to discover
and, so to speak, ‘awaken’ a latent demand; it goes to the
speculative genius [?!] who knows how to estimate, or even
only to sense in advance, the organisational development and
the possibilities of certain connections between individual
enterprises and the banks. . . .”
Translated into ordinary human language this means that
the development of capitalism has arrived at a stage when,
although commodity production still “reigns” and continues to
be regarded as the basis of economic life, it has in reality
been undermined
and the bulk of the profits go to the “geniuses” of financial
manipulation. At the basis of these manipulations and swindles
lies socialised production; but the immense progress of
mankind, which achieved this socialisation, goes to benefit .
. . the speculators. We shall see later how “on these grounds”
reactionary, petty-bourgeois critics of capitalist imperialism
dream of going back to “free”, “peaceful”, and
“honest” competition.
“The
prolonged raising of prices which results from the formation
of cartels,” says Kestner, “has hitherto been observed only in
respect of the most important means of production,
particularly coal, iron and potassium, but never in respect of
manufactured goods. Similarly, the increase in profits
resulting from this raising of prices has been limited only to
the industries which produce means of production. To this
observation we must add that the industries which process raw
materials (and not semi-manufactures) not only secure
advantages from the cartel formation in the shape of high
profits, to the detriment of the finished goods industry, but
have also secured a dominating position over the
latter, which did not exist under free competition.”[16]
The words which I have italicised reveal the essence of
the case which the bourgeois economists admit so reluctantly
and so rarely, and which the present-day defenders of
opportunism, led by Kautsky, so zealously try to evade and
brush aside. Domination, and the violence that is associated
with it, such are the relationships that are typical of the
“latest phase of capitalist development”; this is what
inevitably had to result, and has resulted, from the formation
of all-powerful economic monopolies.
I shall give one more example of the methods employed by
the cartels. Where it is possible to capture all or the chief
sources of raw materials, the rise of cartels and formation of
monopolies is particularly easy. It would be wrong, however,
to assume that monopolies do not arise in other industries in
which it is impossible to corner the sources of raw materials.
The cement industry, for instance, can find its raw materials
everywhere. Yet in Germany this industry too is strongly
cartelised. The cement manufacturers
have formed
regional syndicates: South German, Rhine-Westplialian, etc.
The prices fixed are monopoly prices: 230 to 280 marks a
car-load, when the cost price is 180 marks! The enterprises
pay a dividend of from 12 to 16 per cent—and it must not be
forgotten that the “geniuses” of modern speculation know how
to pocket big profits besides what they draw in dividends. In
order to prevent competition in such a profitable industry,
the monopolists even resort to various stratagems: they spread
false rumours about the bad situation in their industry;
anonymous warnings are published in the newspapers, like the
following: “Capitalists, don’t invest your capital in the
cement industry!”; lastly, they buy up “outsiders” (those
outside the syndicates) and pay them compensation of 60,000,
80,000 and even 150,000 marks.[17]
Monopoly hews a path for itself everywhere without scruple as
to the means, from paying a “modest” sum to buy off
competitors, to the American device of employing dynamite
against them.
The statement that cartels can abolish crises is a fable
spread by bourgeois economists who at all costs desire to
place capitalism in a favourable light. On the contrary, the
monopoly created in certain branches of industry
increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in capitalist
production as a whole. The disparity between the
development of agriculture and that of industry, which is
characteristic of capitalism in general, is increased. The
privileged position of the most highly cartelised, so-called
heavy industry, especially coal and iron, causes “a
still greater lack of co-ordination” in other branches of
industry—as Jeidels, the author of one of the best works on
“the relationship of the German big banks to industry”, admits.[18]
“The
more developed an economic system is,” writes Liefmann, an
unblushing apologist of capitalism, “the more it resorts to
risky enterprises, or enterprises in other countries, to those
which need a great deal of time to develop, or finally, to
those which are only of local importance.”[19]
The
increased risk is
connected in the long run with a prodigious increase of
capital, which, as it were, overflows the brim, flows abroad,
etc. At the same time the extremely rapid rate of technical
progress gives rise to increasing elements of disparity
between the various spheres of national economy, to anarchy
and crises. Liefmann is obliged to admit that: “In all
probability mankind will see further important technical
revolutions in the near future which will also affect the
organisation of the economic system”... electricity and
aviation.... “As a general rule, in such periods of radical
economic change, speculation develops on a large scale.”...[20]
Crises of every kind—economic crises most frequently, but
not only these—in their turn increase very considerably the
tendency towards concentration and towards monopoly. In this
connection, the following reflections of Jeidels on the
significance of the crisis of 1900, which, as we have already
seen, marked the turning-point in the history of modern
monopoly, are exceedingly instructive:
“Side
by side with the gigantic plants in the basic industries, the
crisis of 1900 still found many plants organised on lines that
today would be considered obsolete, the ‘pure’ (non-combined)
plants, which were brought into being at the height of the
industrial boom. The fall in prices and the falling off in
demand put these ‘pure’ enterprises in a precarious position,
which did not affect the gigantic combined enterprises at all
or only affected them for a very short time. As a consequence
of this the crisis of 1900 resulted in a far greater
concentration of industry than the crisis of 1873: the latter
crisis also produced a sort of selection of the best-equipped
enterprises, but owing to the level of technical development
at that time, this selection could not place the firms which
successfully emerged from the crisis in a position of monopoly.
Such a durable monopoly exists to a high degree in the
gigantic enterprises in the modern iron and steel and
electrical industries owing to their very complicated
technique, far-reaching organisation and magnitude of capital,
and, to a lesser degree, in the engineering industry, certain
branches of the metallurgical industry, transport, etc.”[21]
Monopoly! This is the last word in the “latest phase of
capitalist development”. But we shall only have a very
insufficient, incomplete, and poor notion of the real power
and the significance of modern monopolies if we do not take
into consideration the part played by the banks.
Notes
[1]
Figures taken from Annalen des deutschen Reichs,
1911, Zahn —Lenin
[2]
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1912,
p. 202 —Lenin
[3]
Finance Capital, Russ. ed., pp. 286-87 —Lenin
[4]
Hans Gideon Heymann, Die gemischten Werke im deutschen
Grosseisengewerbe, Stuttgart, 1904,
(S. 256,
278). —Lenin
[5]
Hermann Levy, Monopole, Kartelle und Trusts,
Jena, 1909, S. 286, 290, —Lenin
[6]
Th. Vogelstein, “Die finanzielle Organisation der
kapitalistischen Industrie und die Monopolbildungen” in
Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, VI. Abt., Tubingen,
1914. Cf., also by the same author: Organisationsformen
der Eisenindustrie und Textilindustrie in England und Amerika,
Bd. 1, Lpz., 1910. —Lenin
[7]
Dr. Riesser, Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre
Konzentration im Zusammenhange mit der Entwicklung der
Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland, 4. Aufl., 1912, S. 149;
Robert Liefmann, Kartelle und Trusts und die Weiterbildung
der volkswirtschaftlichen Organisation, 2. Aufl., 1910,
S. 25. —Lenin
[8]
Dr. Fritz Kestner, Der Organisationszwang. Eine
Untersuchung über die Kämpfe zwischen Kartellen und
Aussenseitern, Berlin, 1912, S. 11. —Lenin
[9]
R. Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und
Finanziertingsgesellschaften. Eine Studie über den modernen
Kapitalismus und das Effektenwesen, 1. Aufl., Jena, 1909,
S. 212. —Lenin
[10]
Ibid., S. 218. —Lenin
[11]
Dr. S. Tschierschky, Kartell und Trust,
Göttingen, 1903, S. 13. —Lenin
[12]
Tr. Vogelstein, Organisationsformen, S. 275. —Lenin
[13]
Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Tobacco
Industry, Washington, 1909, p. 266, cited according to
Dr. Paul Tafel, Die nordamerikanischen Trusts und ihre
Wirkungen auf den Fortschritt der Technik, Stuttgart,
1913, S. 48. —Lenin
[14]
Dr. P. Tafel, ibid., S. 49. —Lenin
[15]
Riesser, op. cit., third edition, p. 547 et seq. The
newspapers (June 1916) report the formation of a new gigantic
trust which combines the chemical industry of Germany. —Lenin
[16]
Kestner, op.cit., S. 254 —Lenin
[17]
L. Eschwege, “Zement” in Die Bank, 1909, S. 115
et. seq. —Lenin
[18]
Jeidels, Das Verhältnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur
Industrie mit besonderer Berüchsichtigung der Eisenindustrie,
Leipzig, 1905, S. 271 —Lenin
[19]
Liefmann, Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften,
S, 434. —Lenin
[20]
Ibid, S. 465-66 —Lenin
[21]
Jeidels, op. cit., S. 108. —Lenin
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