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IV. Export of Capital
Typical of the old capitalism, when free competition held
undivided sway, was the export of goods. Typical of the latest
stage of capitalism, when monopolies rule, is the export of
capital.
Capitalism is commodity production at its highest stage of
development, when labour-power itself becomes a commodity. The
growth of internal exchange, and, particularly,
of international
exchange, is a characteristic feature of capitalism. The
uneven and spasmodic development of individual enterprises,
individual branches of industry and individual countries is
inevitable under the capitalist system. England became a
capitalist country before any other, and by the middle of the
nineteenth century, having adopted free trade, claimed to be
the “workshop of the world”, the supplier of manufactured
goods to all countries, which in exchange were to keep her
provided with raw materials. But in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, this monopoly was already undermined; for
other countries, sheltering themselves with “protective”
tariffs, developed into independent capitalist states. On the
threshold of the twentieth century we see the formation of a
new type of monopoly: firstly, monopolist associations of
capitalists in all capitalistically developed countries;
secondly, the monopolist position of a few very rich countries,
in which the accumulation of capital has reached gigantic
proportions. An enormous “surplus of capital” has arisen in
the advanced countries.
It goes without saying that if capitalism could develop
agriculture, which today is everywhere lagging terribly behind
industry, if it could raise the living standards of the masses,
who in spite of the amazing technical progress are everywhere
still half-starved and poverty-stricken, there could be no
question of a surplus of capital. This “argument” is very
often advanced by the petty-bourgeois critics of capitalism.
But if capitalism did these things it would not be capitalism;
for both uneven development and a semi-starvation level of
existence of the masses are fundamental and inevitable
conditions and constitute premises of this mode of production.
As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital will
be utilised not for the purpose of raising the standard of
living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a
decline in profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of
increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward
countries. In these backward countries profits are usually
high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively
low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. The export of
capital is made possible by a number of backward countries
having already been drawn into
world capitalist
intercourse; main railways have either been or are being built
in those countries, elementary conditions for industrial
development have been created, etc. The need to export capital
arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has
become “overripe” and (owing to the backward state of
agriculture and the poverty of the masses) capital cannot find
a field for “profitable” investment.
Here are approximate figures showing the amount of capital
invested abroad by the three principal countries[1]
:
|
CAPITAL INVESTED ABROAD
(000,000,000 francs) |
|
Year |
Great Britain |
France |
Germany |
|
1862..... |
3.6 |
— |
— |
|
1872..... |
15.0 |
10 (1869) |
— |
|
1882..... |
22.0 |
15(1880) |
? |
|
1893..... |
42.0 |
20(1890) |
? |
|
1902..... |
62.0 |
27-37 |
12.5
|
|
1914..... |
75-100.0 |
00 |
44.0 |
This table shows that the export of capital reached
enormous dimensions only at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Before the war the capital invested abroad by the
three principal countries amounted to between 175,000 million
and 200,000 million francs. At the modest rate of 5 per cent,
the income from this sum should reach from 8,000 to 10,000
million francs a year—a sound basis for the imperialist
oppression and exploitation of most of the countries and
nations of the world, for the capitalist parasitism of a
handful of wealthy states!
How is this capital invested abroad distributed among the
various countries? Where is it invested? Only an
approximate answer can be given to these questions, but it is
one sufficient to throw light on certain general relations and
connections of modern imperialism.
|
DISTRIBUTION (APPROXIMATE) OF FOREIGN
CAPITAL IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE GLOBE
(circa 1910) |
|
|
Great
Britain |
France |
Germany |
Total |
|
|
|
(000,000,000 marks) |
|
|
Europe.......... |
4 |
23 |
18 |
45 |
|
America.......... |
37 |
4 |
10 |
51 |
|
Asia, Africa, and Australia...... |
29 |
8 |
7 |
44 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total........ |
70 |
35 |
35 |
140 |
The principal spheres of investment of British capital are
the British colonies, which are very large also in America (for
example, Canada), not to mention Asia, etc. In this case,
enormous exports of capital are bound up most closely with
vast colonies, of tile importance of which for imperialism I
shall speak later. In the case of France the situation is
different. French capital exports are invested mainly in
Europe, primarily in Russia (at least ten thousand million
francs). This is mainly loan capital, government loans, and
not capital invested in industrial undertakings. Unlike
British colonial imperialism, French imperialism might be
termed usury imperialism. In the case of Germany, we have a
third type; colonies are inconsiderable, and German capital
invested abroad is divided most evenly between Europe and
America.
The export of capital influences and greatly accelerates
the development of capitalism in those countries to which it
is exported. While, therefore, the export of capital may tend
to a certain extent to arrest development in the
capital-exporting countries, it can only do so by expanding
and deepening the further development of capitalism throughout
the world.
The capital-exporting countries are nearly always able to
obtain certain “advantages”, the character of which throws
light on the peculiarity of the epoch of finance capital and
monopoly. The
following passage, for instance, appeared in the Berlin review,
Die Bank, for October 1913:
“A
comedy worthy of the pen of Aristophanes is lately being
played on the international capital market. Numerous foreign
countries, from Spain to the Balkan states, from Russia to
Argentina, Brazil and China, are openly or secretly coming
into the big money market with demands, sometimes very
persistent, for loans. The money markets are not very bright
at the moment and the political outlook is not promising. But
not a single money market dares to refuse a loan for fear that
its neighbour may forestall it, consent to grant a loan and so
secure some reciprocal service. In these international
transactions the creditor nearly always manages to secure some
extra benefit: a favourable clause in a commercial treaty, a
coating station, a contract to construct a harbour, a fat
concession, or an order for guns.”[2]
Finance capital has created the epoch of monopolies, and
monopolies introduce everywhere monopolist principles: the
utilisation of “connections” for profitable transactions takes
the place of competition on the open market. The most usual
thing is to stipulate that part of the loan granted shall be
spent on purchases in the creditor country, particularly on
orders for war materials, or for ships, etc. In the course of
the last two decades (1890-1910), France has very often
resorted to this method. The export of capital thus becomes a
means of encouraging the export of commodities. In this
connection, transactions between particularly big firms assume
a form which, as Schilder[3]
“mildly” puts it, “borders on corruption”. Krupp in Germany,
Schneider in France, Armstrong in Britain are instances of
firms which have close connections with powerful banks and
governments and which cannot easily be “ignored” when a loan
is being arranged.
France, when granting loans to Russia, “squeezed” her in
the commercial treaty of September 16, 1905, stipulating for
certain concessions to run till 1917. She did the same in the
commercial treaty with Japan of August 19, 1911. The tariff
war between Austria and Serbia, which lasted,
with a seven
months’ interval, from 1906 to 1911, was partly caused by
Austria and France competing to supply Serbia with war
materials. In January 1912, Paul Deschanel stated in the
Chamber of Deputies that from 1908 to 1911 French firms had
supplied war materials to Serbia to the value of 45 million
francs.
A report from the Austro-Hungarian Consul at San-Paulo (Brazil)
states: “The Brazilian railways are being built chiefly by
French, Belgian, British and German capital. In the financial
operations connected with the construction of these railways
the countries involved stipulate for orders for the necessary
railway materials.”
Thus finance capital, literally, one might say, spreads
its net over all countries of the world. An important role in
this is played by banks founded in the colonies and by their
branches. German imperialists look with envy at the “old”
colonial countries which have been particularly “successful”
in providing for themselves in this respect. In 1904, Great
Britain had 50 colonial banks with 2,279 branches (in 1910
there were 72 banks with 5,449 branches), France had 20 with
136 branches; Holland, 16 with 68 branches; and Germany had
“only” 13 with 70 branches.[4]
The American capitalists, in their turn, are jealous of the
English and German: “In South America,” they complained in
1915, “five German banks have forty branches and five British
banks have seventy branches.... Britain and Germany have
invested in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the last
twenty-five years approximately four thousand million dollars,
and as a result together enjoy 46 per cent of the total trade
of these three countries.”[5]
The capital-exporting countries have divided the world
among themselves in the figurative sense of the term. But
finance capital has led to the actual division of the
world.
Notes
[1]
Hobson, Imperialism, London, 1902, p. 58; Riesser,
op. cit., S. 395 und 404; P. Arndt in Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv, Bd. 7, 1916, S. 35; Neymarck in Bulletin;
Hilferding, Finance Capital, p. 492; Lloyd George,
Speech in the House of Commons, May 4, 1915. reported in the
Daily Telegraph, May 5, 1915; B. Harms, Probleme
der Weltwirtschaft , Jena, 1912, S. 235 et seq.; Dr.
Siegmund Schilder, Entwicklungstendenzen der
Weltwirtschaft, Berlin, 1912, Band 1, S. 150; George
Paish, “Great Britain’s Capital Investments, etc.”, in
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LXXIV,
1910-11, P. 167 et seq.; Georges Diouritch, L’Expansion
des banques allemandes a l’ètranger, ses rapports avec le
développement économique de l’Allemagne, Paris, 1909, p.
84. —Lenin
[2]
Die Bank, 1913, 2, S. 1024-25. —Lenin
[3]
Schilder, op. cit., S. 346, 350, 371. —Lenin
[4]
Riesser, op. cit., 4th ed., S. 375; Diouritch, p. 283. —Lenin
[5]
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Vol. LIX, May 1915, p. 301. In the same volume
on p. 3.31, we read that the well-known statistician Paish, in
the last issue of the financial magazine The Statist,
estimated the amount of capital exported by Britain, Germany,
France, Belgium and Holland at $40,000 million, i.e., 200,000
million francs. —Lenin
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